Yanis Varoufakis full transcript: our battle to save Greece

H συνέντευξη του Γιάνη Βαρουφάκη δόθηκε πριν από την οδυνηρή και κατάπτυστη συμφωνία Τσίπρα στις Βρυξέλλες

Σύμφωνα με τον κ. Βαρουφάκη, από την αρχή των διαπραγματεύσεων, οι πιστωτές εν ολίγοις του ξεκαθάρισαν πως είτε θα δεχθεί τη συμφωνία ή η συμφωνία είναι νεκρή, σημειώνοντας παράλληλα πως ενώ η ελληνική πλευρά παρουσίαζε τα στοιχεία που της ζητούνταν (όπως π.χ. τη δημοσιονομική κατάσταση της Ελλάδας, τα στοιχεία για τις κρατικές οντότητες) και ανέπτυσσε τα σχέδιά της για τον ΦΠΑ, οι πιστωτές απέρριπταν τις προτάσεις χωρίς όμως να δίνουν κάποια δική τους εναλλακτική πρόταση. «Στη συνέχεια, πριν προλάβουμε να συμφωνήσουμε μαζί τους για τον ΦΠΑ, θα άλλαζαν θέμα και θα πήγαιναν στις αποκρατικοποιήσεις».

Would leaving euro be more of a catastrophe for Greece than staying?

Βy Larry Elliot

Source – the guardian

Leaving the single currency will have all sorts of economic and political costs for Athens, but Iceland’s experience after the banking crisis could prove illuminating

Yanis Varoufakis rues the day when Greece joined the euro. The Greek finance minister says his country would be better off if it was still using the drachma. Deep down, he says, all 18 countries using the single currency wish that the idea had been strangled at birth but understand that once you are in you don’t get out without a catastrophe.

All of that is true, and explains why Greece is involved in a game of chicken with all the other players in this drama: the International Monetary Fund, the European commission, the European Central Bank and the German government. Varoufakis wants more financial help but not if it means sending the Greek economy into a “death spiral”. Greece’s creditors will not stump up any more cash until Athens sticks to bailout conditions that Varoufakis says would do just that.

Greece and the EU: a question of trust

Της Frances Coppola

I have been mulling over the terms of the agreement between Greece and the Eurogoup. Initially, I thought that Greece had ended up with an appalling deal, getting almost none of its aims and losing control of EFSF funding for its banks. The retention of future primary surplus targets under the November 2012 agreement – only the target for this year is under review – seemed particularly harsh.

But then I listened to Pierre Moscovici explaining the thinking behind the deal, and suddenly the penny dropped. We’ve all been missing the point. Holger Schmieding of Berenberg Bank was on the right lines – he commented recently that the real problem in the Greek negotiations was that trust had broken down. Indeed it has. But not recently. Trust in Greece broke down a long time ago.

The most obvious breakdown in trust happened in 2010 when the extent of Greece’s indebtedness was revealed – and the lengths to which it had gone to conceal its true position. With the help of Goldman Sachs, it had lied about its finances to gain admission to the Euro in 2001, and had been living a lie ever since.  

What on earth is the ECB up to?

by Frances Coppola

The ECB has abruptly announced withdrawal of the “waiver” under which it was prepared to accept Greek sovereign bonds as collateral for liquidity. This created a considerable Twitter storm, with lots of angry people saying the ECB’s action was beyond its mandate and far too precipitate: it should at least have waited for the Greek Finance Minister, Yanis Varoufakis, to meet his German counterpart, and it should not be acting as if the bailout programme was ended when negotiations were still proceeding. I admit, I was one of those people.

And I stand by my views. The ECB is acting far beyond its mandate in seeking to influence negotiations between Eurozone member states regarding the terms and conditions under which member states lend to their distressed partners. It has no business interfering in fiscal policy: if the Greek government decides to run 1.5% fiscal surpluses instead of 4.5%, hike minimum wages and create lots of government jobs, it is none of the ECB’s business. The ECB’s monetary policy failures are legion: it should put its own house in order, rather than interfering with the conduct of fiscal policy. And worse, its persistent interference in fiscal policy is a clear conflict of interest, as the Advocate General of the European Court of Justice noted in relation to the OMT programme. It should not be a member of the Troika at all, and certainly should not use changes in fiscal policy by a democratically-elected sovereign government – even one that has inherited an economy in tatters with a massive debt burden – as justification for limiting liquidity to that country’s banking system. Monetary policy should never be used to serve fiscal or political ends. Not ever. 

Ελλάδα: το ζήτημα των πλειστηριασμών

Του Δημήτρη Παπουτσή

Οι πραγματικές διαστάσεις  

Είναι απαραίτητο να αναφερθούν εξ’αρχής μερικά στοιχεία. Τη χρονιά που, ανεύθυνα, οι κυβερνώντες επέβαλαν στη χώρα την τρόικα (ΔΝΤ-Ευρ. Τράπεζα-Ε.Ε.) ως εκπρόσωπο των δανειστών και υπέγραψαν, χωρίς καμιά διαπραγμάτευση, το Α μνημόνιο, οι συνολικές επισφάλειες των Ελληνικών Τραπεζών (οι οποίες κατά τη χρηματοπιστωτική κρίση που ξεκίνησε το 2008 δεν κινδύνευαν λόγω του ότι δεν είχαν μεγάλη έκθεση σε τοξικά προϊόντα) ανέρχονταν σε περίπου 300 δις ευρώ, κατανεμημένες περίπου ως εξής:  100 δις σε ομόλογα του Ελληνικού Δημοσίου, 100 δις σε επιχειρηματικά δάνεια και 100 δις σε στεγαστικά και καταναλωτικά. Περίπου 450.000 νοικοκυριά έχουν λάβει στεγαστικά δάνεια,  κυρίως την περίοδο μετά την ένταξη της χώρας στο ευρώ (2000), με το συνολικό ποσό να ανέρχεται σε 72 δις ευρώ. Το ποσό αυτό αντιστοιχεί στο 40% περίπου του ΑΕΠ και είναι πολύ μικρό σε σχέση με άλλες χώρες.